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4ABSTRACT
Colonial judges and jurists interpreted  matrilineal customs in
terms of a theory of matrilineal law, which they shaped in the process of
interpretation, rather than on the basis of existing practices. This paper
analyses critically the process  of interpretation of customs or what is
referred to as the legal discourse on matriliny, from the standpoint of its
own assumptions, i.e., the ideas and theory that shaped and governed it.
It is argued that a theory of matrilineal law, informed by mid nineteenth
century anthropological and comparative legal perspectives, gendered
the detail of matrilineal law, emphasising rigidly older male control
over property and excluding women, virtually, from all functions of
authority. The legal discourse on matriliny then despite or precisely
because of the implicit connection between women and matriliny, was
not so much about matriliny or women but about what comprised
‘authentic’ custom.
Key words :   colonial law, customary practice, matriliny, gender,
property rights
5Action guided by a ‘feel for the game’ has all the
appearances of the rational action that an impartial
observer, endowed with all the necessary information and
capable of mastering it rationally, would deduce.  And yet
it is not based on reason.  You need only think of the
impulsive decision made by the tennis player who runs
up to the net, to understand that it has nothing in common
with the learned construction that the coach, after analysis,
draws up in order to explain it and deduce communicable
lessons from it.  The conditions of rational calculation are
practically never given in practice: time is limited,
information is restricted, etc.  And yet agents  do do, much
more often than if they were behaving randomly, ‘the only
thing to do’.  This is because, following the intuitions of
a ‘logic of practice’ which is the product of a lasting
exposure to conditions similar to those in which they are
placed, they anticipate the necessity immanent in the way
of the world.
Pierre Bourdieu1
By the close of the nineteenth century, British judges and jurists
had built up a corpus of matrilineal custom in Malabar and South Canara
districts of the erstwhile Madras Presidency through legal theorizing,
dispute arbitration and precedents established by the civil courts. In the
1 In other Words: Essays towards a Reflexive Sociology (Cambridge: Polity
Press, 1990), p11.
6legal discourse on matriliny, these customs were framed as the real
customs i.e., as against others that had not stood the test of court
procedure.2   This paper is a critical analysis of the legal discourse from
the standpoint of its own assumptions, i.e., the ideas and theory that
shaped and governed it.  Colonial administrators were agreed that
customary practice, rather than any religious precepts embodied in
written sources, was the source of personal/family law for the matrilineal
groups in this region. 3   Operationally, it was left to the civil courts to
interpret, define and administer custom as and when disputes were
brought before them.4   There having been no effort to collect and code
them, the courts sought to determine custom at the point of a dispute on
the assumption then that the real practices could be filtered from the
context and yet regardless of the specificity of disputes.5    A perusal of
2 Legal discourse on matriliny refers to a specific mode of interpretation of
matrilineal customs articulated through the administrative, specially, legal
and judicial processes of the colonial state.
3 In the words of William Logan, an administrator-historian with extensive
experience of Malabar, “if it were necessary to sum up in one word the law
of the country… that word would undoubtedly be the word “custom”.  In
Malayalam it would be “Maryada”, “Margam”, “Acharam” all signifying
established rule and custom…” (emphasis in the original).  William Logan,
Malabar Manual, in two volumes, Vol I, New Delhi: Asian Educational
Services, 1995, p 111.
4 The first general inquiry into customary practice in Malabar was undertaken
by the Malabar Marriage Commission, set up in 1891, a full century after
the East India Company wrested control from Tipu Sultan in 1792.  Besides,
this inquiry was more to assess the mood for change in the customary
marriage practice than to codify custom on the basis of existing practices.
Report of the Malabar Marriage Commission, (henceforth RMMC) I (Madras:
Lawrence Asylum Press, 1891), p 1.
5 Consider further Cohn’s observation that British modeling of the process of
adjudication in the courts on that of British law courts of the period had
implications for the nature of cases.  For disputes which had continuity
(stretching back and forth in time) and complex contexts were reduced to
the specificity of a ‘case’.  Bernard Cohn, ‘Some Notes on Law and Change
in North India’, in An Anthropologist among Historians and Other Essays
(New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp 568-574.
7the case law on matrilineal customs suggests that customs were
interpreted not on the basis of existing practices but in terms of a theory
of matrilineal law, itself shaped in the process of interpretation.  P R
Sundara Aiyar, a Madras High Court Judge and an early twentieth century
compiler of matrilineal law, seems keenly aware of this, “[w]hile the law
of property among the marumakkatayis was based entirely on usages,
British exponents of the law allowed little weight to the views of the
people and were guided by their own notions of a perfect system of
marumakkatayam law”.6
Central to the colonial theory of matrilineal law was a regulatory
notion of custom — the principles of marumakkatayam  or aliyasantana7
law.  In turn these principles were defined externally with reference to
modern patrilineal frameworks of interpretation, i.e., informed by
comparative legal and nineteenth century anthropological theories from
Europe and north America. By the middle of the nineteenth century,
Lewis Henry Morgan had marshaled considerable if scattered evidence
of cross cultural kinship to stake a conjectural but influential history of
the evolution of the family.  Morgan relegated matrilineal societies to
the prehistory of patriarchal society.  However, if Morgan had helped
dispatch matriliny to antiquity, it was Henry Summer Maine’s Patriarchal
theory that informed the detail of the legal understanding of the
6 A Treatise on Malabar and Aliyasantana Law, (Madras: Madras Law Journal
Office, 1922), p 13. Marumakkatayam refers to the practice of inheritance
by one’s sister’s children.  Here ‘ego’ is necessarily male.  Marumakkatayam,
however, was understood in opposition to makkatayam (literally, inheritance
to one’s children, where again ‘ego’ is male), the lineage practice of the
Nambudiris (brahmins).
7 Aliyasantana is a Kannada term for matriliny followed by certain Tulu-
speaking castes in the erstwhile South Canara district of the Madras Presidency.
8matrilineal family.8   Nineteenth century comparative legal perspectives
made it possible to move easily between Roman and Hindu law and to
interpret matrilineal families in terms of the patrilineal (whether Roman
or Hindu) i.e., as the archaic form of the patriarchal family in a linear
evolutionist theory of society.9   From this it became possible to identify
with the matrilineal family characteristics associated with the patriarchal
family in its archaic form and matrilineal customs were interpreted in
analogy with more familiar customs of patrilineal and patriarchal
societies – both western and ‘Hindu’ – albeit of another time.
This is not to suggest that there was no effort to collect information
on customs. Apart from the cases made out by the litigants, when the
judges of the High Court felt the need, they sent for more information
from the lower courts.  Such information however was evaluated in
terms of the theory. The judges denote acceptable or ‘authentic’ custom
in terms of certain characteristics.  Foremost custom had to be general
and consistent.  They had to be established on the basis of the ‘clearest
evidence’ and ‘proof’ as against ‘vague statements’.  ‘Evidence’ in this
8 Publishing before Morgan, Maine had posited the Patriarchal Theory, wherein
the Patriarchal family was at the ‘primitive’ stage.  Morgan posits the
patriarchal family at a much higher stage in the evolution of the family. The
differences between Morgan and Maine though wide were of little
importance to the legal discourse. For an insightful discussion of these
differences as of the coming into being of kinship as a field see Thomas R.
Trautmann,  Lewis Henry Morgan and the Invention of Kinship, (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1987).
9 Maine’s work, which set up a comparative legal perspective on evolution
using Roman, Greek and Hindu law, was particularly influential.  However,
the study of Indo-European languages and orientalist literature beginning
in the late eighteenth century had already ‘invented’ a common base for
Roman and Hindu societies/languages.  Ibid.
9sense was already inscribed by a theory.10   As Neeladri Bhattacharya
points out it was assumed that the underlying principles of practices
could be grasped through modern theories.  “Observed facts made sense
only within such a framework of explanation…[O]nce the essential
principles were understood, ambiguities and confusions could be ironed
out and the real practices systematized into codified rules.”11   In some
cases, the weight of information was heavily against the dictates of the
theory, certain practices were accepted as ‘exceptions’, a term used to
suggest a movement away from the ‘authentic’ and ‘original’ customs
towards altered forms.
However there were more impetuous ways in which a patrilineal
‘commonsense’ spoke through the colonial administration.  Face to face
with matriliny, British judges betrayed a sense of acute uneasiness. They
warned that the system was “difficult”, “peculiar” and potentially
anarchic, moving then to contain the difference that it marked through
tight enforcement of rules. This anxiety was particularly apparent when
adjudicating on claims that contested the authority of the senior male.
It is instructive that much of the direction and inflexibility
regarding the rules of matrilineal law emanated from the higher courts,
10 Neeladri Bhattacharya’s reading of the project of codification of custom in
colonial Punjab has been very useful in understanding the conception of
custom deployed in the project.  In Punjab too custom was recognized as
the basis of personal law but unlike in Malabar the government made
efforts to codify custom on the basis of an extensive inquiry in the middle
of the nineteenth century.  Not unlike the theory of matriliny, “Indian
evidence had no constitutive power in the making of this theory; the theory
provided the frame through which the evidence was understood and
ordered.” Neeladri Bhattacharya,  ‘Remaking Custom: The Discourse and
Practice of Colonial Codification’, in R. Champakalakshmi and S. Gopal
eds. Tradition, Dissent and Ideology: Essays in Honour of Romila Thapar,
(Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996), p 26.
11 Ibid, p 38.
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the District and High Courts.  For instance, cases brought to court seeking
the partition of taravads (matrilineal joint family),
were constantly successful in the Provincial Courts, but
were invariably foiled on appeal to the Sudder Court at
Madras, the objection being frequently taken for the first
time by an English Barrister.  It so happened that... the
Sudder Court possessed one or more Judges, who were
thoroughly acquainted with Malabar custom, and by
whom cases from the district were invariably heard. 12
Family customs as well as land relations came up for arbitration
increasingly in the second half of the nineteenth century; a time when
the importance of control over property and other resources was
becoming clear.13   Besides, matriliny was coming under increasing moral
censure for the ‘non-conformative’ sexual and property practices that it
sanctioned.  It is not unlikely then that the information collected was
12 Lewis Moore, Malabar Law and Custom (Madras: Higginbothams, 1905),
p 16.  In a case under aliyasantana, Holloway held that, “[I]f this indisputable
rule had been abrogated by decisions of the highest courts of appeal… how
much so ever I should have lamented that Judges had overstepped their
proper duty of declaring law, I should… have followed such decisions.
Here, however, the only decisions pronounced are those of inferior Courts,
evidently influenced by their view of expediency in the particular case
before them. …Decisions dividing the family property have also been
passed in Malabar and it is one of the claims of our late colleague Mr Justice
Strange...that he successfully resisted the attempts of lower courts... to
introduce foreign admixtures into a law of which whatever may be thought
of the policy none can deny the consistency of the theory upon which it is
based” (emphasis added).  Munda chetti v Timmaju Hensu, Madras High
Court Reports (henceforth MHCR), Vol 1 (1862-63), p 380.
1 3 Sharpening the struggle for land as property, this period saw a series of
agrarian revolts by Mappilla tenants against the denial of their conventional
land rights by upper caste ‘Hindu’ janmis.  K. N. Panikkar, Against Lord
and State: Religion and Peasant Uprising in Malabar, 1836-1921, (Delhi:
Oxford University Press, 1989).
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skewed against such practices, both consolidating patriarchal hold over
property and resisting the censure of Victorian morality.14
And yet this was only one part of the determination of customs.
Sections that stood to benefit from court interpretations disputed plural
practices.  This sometimes led to complications and over time the courts
were forced to set new boundaries to earlier interpretations, which
however, did little to dispel the ‘framework of rules’. But just how far
did the colonial legal processes go to alter the plurality of practice?  It is
apparent from the cases that came to court in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries that plural practices continued to prevail.
Precedents sent signals regarding what was acceptable ‘according to the
law’ and opened up possibilities against variant practices.
The analysis here is not restricted to any one social group or form
of matriliny.  Marumakkatayam and aliyasantana were perceived as
founded upon the same principles and hence partaking of the same
customs.  Deriving the validity of practices from abstractions of matriliny
such as ‘that system which vests property in the females of the family’,
or ‘the rule of nephews’ made the interpretation of practices of one form
available to the other; it gave them a common base in the legal
14 Information regarding matrilineal customs was accessed invariably from
upper caste men (who were also the superior interest groups in land).   This
is a settled tendency by the time of the Malabar Marriage Commission,
which states that, “[m]arumakkatayam possesses no code… Prior to the
advent of the British there were no courts of justice to record case law; and
the Nambudiri Brahmins monopolized the study of the Shastras and were
the sole recognised repositories of the unwritten custom of the country.”
RMMC I, p 9.
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discourse.15   The only major difference in interpretation lay in the
recognition of female heads of family as customary under aliyasantana
law.16   The framework of matrilineal law, evolved in the civil courts, was
generalised for matrilineal groups in Malabar and South Canara.  They
included the marumakkatayam Tiyas, and Nairs and the aliyasantana
Bants and Billavas,17  categorised as Hindu and the marumakkatayam
Mappillas, a Sunni Muslim group.18   Initially the judges were hesitant
in recognising that the Mappillas in north Malabar observed
marumakkatayam and not Islamic rules.  However in a case in 1860,
Judge William Holloway seems to have settled the issue holding that,
15 For instance, aliyasantana was brought under the purview Malabar Marriage
Act, 1898 and was removed only at the very last moment from the Madras
Marumakkatayam Act, 1933.  Judges took recourse frequently to cross
references.  Refusal to grant legitimacy to customary marriage in
aliyasantana was extended to marumakkatayam, while previously the judges
used the incidents of marriage general among the Nairs of south Malabar/
central Kerala to assess the legal status of marriage under aliyasantana.  For
a discussion see Praveena Kodoth, ‘Courting Legitimacy or Delegitimising
Custom? Sexuality, Sambandham and Marriage Reform in Late Nineteenth
Century Malabar’, Modern Asian Studies, Vol 35 (2), 2001.
16 In Holloway’s words, “[t]his system of inheritance differs only from that of
Malabar in more consistently carrying out the doctrine that all rights to
property are derived from the females”.  Munda Chetty V Timmaju Hensu,
MHCR 1, (1862-63), p 380.
17 The Tiyas of north Kerala and the Billavas observed similar forms of social
and property organization and were predominantly small peasant and
agricultural labour castes, who with the benefit of colonial ethnography,
were better known for the ‘caste occupation’ of toddy tapping.  The Nairs,
a ‘middle’ caste, were matrilineal throughout Kerala but their position in the
land hierarchy varied regionally.  The Bants were a principal land ‘owning’
and cultivating caste and in aspects of social and property organization
were very like the Nairs of north Malabar.
18 Mappillas in north Malabar were matrilineal and had considerable interests
in land and trade. Also their socio-economic profile was quite distinct from
that of the Mappillas of south Malabar.  Kathleen Gough, ‘Mappillas, North
Kerala’, in David Schneider and Kathleen Gough eds. Matrilineal Kinship
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961), pp 416-17.
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“[t]he presumption of course is that the descent is that of nephews, as is
the rule of North Malabar universally”.19
The taravad  referred to relations of property (mudal sambandham)
shared by a group tracing descent from a common ancestress. In fact,
this was the only sense in which the taravad was understood in the legal
discourse.  The outer boundary of  taravads  seems to have been defined
by relations of pollution (pula sambandham), whereby a wider matrilineal
kin group was knit by symbolic ties — prominently in sharing birth and
death pollution and a memory of common descent.20   This paper is in
five sections. Section two is an attempt to take up issues of administration
of justice during the British period. In the following section I have
reviewed critically two very different approaches to matriliny to be
found in anthropological literature in an attempt to draw out their
assumptions. Section four is a gendered analysis of the legal discourse
on matriliny.  The conclusion draws together the interplay of theory and
‘commonsense’ in  the colonial discourse on matriliny.
Administration of Justice
The larger picture of course was the administration of civil justice
through the courts of law; an important function of governance and a
site of the articulation of colonial authority. The Joint Commissioners
reporting on Malabar in 1792-93 display keen awareness of this.
19 The decision in the case was affirmed by the Sudder Court in Madras.
Mallile Uppanna Pallichi V Telalkunata Musaliyar Avella, Moore, Malabar
Law, p 324.
20 However there are indications that when expediency demanded it was possible
to break off pollution ties. C. H. Kunhappa illustrates this for the divisions
that traced lineage to Ayilliam in Chirakkal taluk. Being a numerically large
taravad, comprising a considerable section of the population of this territory,
death and birth pollution spelt a great inconvenience.  It had been decided
to terminate pollution ties, even while the related groups continued to share
a cremation ground C. H. Kunhappa, Smaranakal Matram, (Autobiography)
(Kozhikode: Mathrubhumi Press, 1981), p 17.
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And with a view to opening the eyes of the natives to the
real and effectual control of our government, in respect of
the judicial as well as the other branches of administration,
the 49th article directs the courts to itinerate during the
fair season, throughout their respective jurisdictions…‘‘to
the end” “that their judicial influence, powers and control,
may as speedily and as effectually as possible, be felt and
understood to pervade every branch of administration so
as to secure everyone his just rights.”  21
Malabar was fragmented politically in the precolonial period
before the Mysorean regime sought to contain the local rulers in the
eighteenth century.  The nature of legal institutions and processes prior
to colonial rule in Malabar has received little scholarly attention.
Kathleen Gough notes almost in passing that the greater proliferation of
rulers and chieftains in northern Kerala (read also north Malabar) went
along with less centralized judicial than in central Kerala.22   E. J. Miller
is more forthcoming in his accounts of caste and village structure. 23
His account suggests that political dominion (kingship) and legal
21 Reports of a Joint Commission from Bengal and Bombay, appointed to
Inspect into the State and Condition of the Province of Malabar in the year
1792 and 1793, (Madras: Fort Saint George Gazette Press, 1862) p 124.
2 2 Kathleen Gough, ‘Nayars: North Kerala’ in Schneider and Gough (ed).
Matrilineal Kinship, p 386.  See also C. A. Innes, Malabar Gazetteer,
(Trivandrum: Government Press, 1999), pp 381-384. The undulating terrain,
with mountains coming close to the sea and extensive forest cover, facilitated
both scattered settlements and fragmentation of authority structures.
23 Eric J. Miller: ‘Caste and Territory in Malabar’, American Anthropologist,
Vol 56, 1954, pp 415-16.   See also his ‘Village Structure in North Kerala’,
in M.N. Srinivas (ed.) India’s Villages, (Bombay: Asia Publishing House,
1960).
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jurisdictions did not necessarily coincide.24   However, “juridical
authority neatly coincided with political authority and economic power
and the political and juridical authority of headmen and chieftains was
also buttressed by trusteeship of the chief temple in the area and in
certain other ways.”25   He suggests that every caste in the village had
some sort of internal organization through which internal disputes could
be settled and that the higher castes could sometimes intercede in dispute
arbitration of lower castes.26   But the village was not necessarily or the
only unit of justice administration. For instance, among the Tiyas of
24 This is apparent from several commentators of the period.  K.P. Padmanabha
Menon is particularly caustic in pointing out that rulers did not function as
chief magistrates and the details of internal administration was left to chieftains
and elders of communities who had their own organizations for the purpose.
K.P. Padmanabha Menon, History of Kerala, Vol 2, (New Delhi: Asian
Educational Services, 1983), p 248.
25 Miller, ‘Village in North Kerala’, p 46 and ‘Caste and Territory in Malabar’,
pp 412-414.  There is considerable evidence of the interlocking of religious-
ritual and civil institutions in defining the functioning of justice.  K.K.N.
Kurup notes the role of local shrines (kavu), with dominant Nair taravads
of a locality as controlling patrons, in punishing infringement of norms.
Kurup (ed.), Koodali Granthavari, Calicut University Historical Series,
(Calicut: Empire Press, 1995), p xiii, p 24.  In an account of Kottayam
taluk, Kumaran points out that the position of a  tara karanavan (a village
elder) among the Tiyas was tied to responsibilities arising from local shrines.
Murkkoth Kumaran, ‘Atmakatha’, in Murkkoth Kunhappa (ed.) Murkkoth
Kumaran (Kottayam: National Book Stall, 1985), p 32.
26 Ibid pp 46-47.  See also Padmanabha Menon, History of Kerala, p 248.
Kumaran describes the legal institutions of the Tiyas a) for internal
administration and b) with authority over specific lower castes.  To break a
spell of ritual pollution arising from death, birth or menstruation, the Tiyas
and higher castes were required to receive a change of clothes from a
Vannati (a woman of a caste lower than the Tiyas).  Authority over this caste
was with the Tiya elders of a locality, who could prevent the mattu (change
of clothes) being presented to families even of higher castes.   Denial of
mattu was hard punishment prescribed against those who flouted caste
regulations (jatyacharam).  However, this subversive edge of caste
organization was rarely used.   Kumaran, ‘Atmakatha’, p 32.   See also
Thurston and Rangachari, Caste and Tribes, Vol. 7, pp 39-40.
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Chirakkal, a Tiya stani (dignitary or holder of title) from the Muthedath
Aramanakkal family had the authority to decide caste disputes and his
jurisdiction was invoked on appeal.27   Among the Tiyas in Kottayam,
juridical authority was dispersed and vested in the nattu karanavanmar
(caste elders), a right possessed by specific taravads for each locality.28
Caste intersected with region defining variations in territorial
jurisdictions differently for each group.  For instance, it is known that
the Nambudiris were to some degree above territorial or political
divisions and had easy mobility throughout Kerala.29   This went along
with greater uniformity of custom throughout Malabar/Kerala than among
the lower castes.30    For instance, the organization of marriage among
the Nairs and Tiyas in the region north of the Korapuzha (Kora river,
about 9 miles north of Calicut) was considerably different from south
27 Depositions by Muthedath Aramanakkal Kunyi Kelappan Mannanar, and
K. Krishnan Vazhunavar, RMMC II, Appendix IV.  The family, with vast
land holdings in the eastern hilly tracts of Chirakkal taluk, is noted to have
given refuge to Antarjanams, Nambudiri women, who were declared
outcastes in a smarthavicharam, an inquiry held when an antarjanam is
suspected of adultery. Logan, Malabar, Vol I, p 126.  Thurston and
Rangachari, Caste and Tribes, Vol. 5, p 43.
28 Deposition by Panangandan Raman, RMMC II, Appendix IV, C. K.
Revathiamma, Sahasrapoornima (Autobiography) (Tellicherry:
Vidyavilasom Press, 1977), p 101.   In Kottayam, unlike in the other taluks,
there were a number of dominant Tiya taravads, who were janmis and
village heads.  Ibid. Murkkoth Kumaran, ‘Atmakatha’, p13.  Kumaran calls
them the tara karanavanmar, denoting the tara (very generally a village)
corresponding broadly with three or four amsams.  The taras were grouped
into desams and further into a nadu.  The elders or karanavar of a tara,
desavazhis and naduvazhis (chieftains) administered justice but not in the
mode of paid officials.  Besides, Tiya elders of a locality could constitute
different kinds of sabhas according to the nature of a complaint. Ibid.  See
also K.P. Padmanabha Menon, History of Kerala, Vol 2, p 248.
29 Gough, ‘Nayar: Central Kerala’, in Schneider and Gough (ed). Matrilineal
Kinship, p 306.  Miller, ‘Caste and Territory in Malabar’, p 416.
30 Ibid.
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Malabar.31   Even in the early twentieth century there were clear
restrictions against Nair women from north Kerala marrying men from
south Malabar.32
If Conflict resolution and the processes of reproducing norms of
justice were locally embedded they were also dispersed over several
sites.   Clearly they were not defined centrally in relation to the state, but
they were also not exhausted over any single site — state, family, caste
based and cultural institutions.  The complexity of this dispersal over
even a single site is evident in the ritualistic performative practice of
teyyam (daivam or god) observed in Kasargod, Chirakkal and the norther
part of Kottayam taluks.33   The preparation for and performance of  teyyam
31 Miller has noted that Nair taravads in north Malabar were matrilineal with
virilocal post marital residence for at least 300 years preceding British rule.
Cited in Dilip Menon, Caste, Nationalism and Communism in South India,
Malabar 1900-1940, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p
11. See also Miller, Caste and Territory in Malabar, p 416. Gough, ‘Nayar:
North Kerala’, p 390.
32 In the nineteenth century the Korapuzha constituted a cultural boundary
and social relations for the lower castes/social groups were to some extent
restricted to the region, though it formed several political units. Miller,
‘Caste and Territory in Malabar’, p 416. Ravindran Gopinath, ‘Garden and
Paddy Fields: Historical Implications of Agricultural Production Regimes in
Colonial Malabar’ in Mushirul Hasan and Narayani Gupta (eds.), India's
Colonial Encounters: Essays in Memory of Eric Stokes, Delhi: Monohar
Publishers, 1993, p 367.  There is extensive discussion of this and local
efforts to challenge it in the evidence collected by the Malabar Marriage
Commission RMMC II.  See also K. T. Chandu Nambiar, Samudaya Chinta,
Address to the 21st Session of the Uttara Kerala Nair Samajam, (Tellicherry,
1932), p 25 and S. J. Puthenkalam, Marriage and Family in Kerala, (Calgary:
Department of Sociology, University of Calgary, 1977), p 55.
33 There were numerous teyyams, with thematic categorizations corresponding
broadly to eco-cultural zones, the eastern hilly region, midlands and coastal
areas, though this did not prevent a teyyam observed mostly in the coastal
areas from having its ‘source’ (asthanam) in or from tracing its story to
places in the eastern hills.  Teyyams and their stories crisscrossed over the
different eco cultural regions but retained a distinct flavour of one or other
of them.  Certain Teyyams were associated primarily with one or other caste
but drew in other castes as patrons, service providers or worshippers.  I am
indebted to K.K. Marar, a scholar from Tellicherry, who has done extensive
research on teyyam, for this perspective.
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drew together different sections of local society through specific
avakasams (an inseparable combination of privilege and responsibility
associated with a service or status) or as a community of believers.34
“The teyyattam sought to create a moral community through the
establishment of a sense of limits – thus far and no farther.  By deification
of victims, it created a collective imagination of what was just and
unjust.”35   As a teyyam, a ‘performer’ from specific lower castes could
chastise people much higher in the caste hierarchy as also people of
local importance for misdeeds.36   Several of the stories performed dealt
with local tensions, injustice, and punishment in the context of day to
day caste and family tensions; they retold time and again the distinction
between acceptable codes of behaviour and excess.
It was against these severally layered processes of administration
of law, informed by notions of territory, caste and gender that the British
set up the multi-tiered civil courts.37   That the existing institutions
would decline only gradually was in some measure anticipated by the
early officials.38
34 Though the shrine festivals and Teyyam performances in north Kerala were
associated with the lower castes, in some instances the Nambudiris too, who
in the region were few and far between, were drawn in as patrons.
35 Dilip M Menon, ‘The Moral Community of the Teyyattam: Popular Culture
in Late Colonial Malabar’, in Studies in History, Vol 9, No. 2, 1993, p 199.
36 Ibid, p 199.  Besides, teyyams continue even today to be called upon to
intercede directly in dispute arbitration. I thank Rajesh Kumar Komath for
drawing my attention to this.
3 7 As Marc Galanter notes in undertaking to administer the law in government
courts rather than merely supervising the administration of law, the British
initiated a process of ‘expropriation’ of law.  It gave the government the
power to “find, declare and apply” the law. Marc Galanter, Law and Society
in Modern India, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), p 17.
38 For instance several smartavicharam, inquiry-based effort to elicit a
confession from an antarjanam suspected usually of adultery, were conducted
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.   One of the last effective ones was
conducted in 1918 under the sanction of the Raja of Cochin.   A.M.N
Chakiar, ‘The Last Smarta Vicharam’, (Tripunitara, 1998), p 95.
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The regulations [for the administration of justice in civil
cases]…went rather to secure to the inhabitants one certain
Judicature where they might, if they found it necessary,
apply and obtain justice than entirely to deprive and
prohibit the different Rajas from the exercise of the full
and general judicial powers which they themselves
considered as inherently vested in them,…accompanied
with this further precaution that Rajas inquiries and
decisions on such reference were revisable by the said
court in all cases in which either of the parties were
dissatisfied with the results thereof….39
In some cases the colonial regime picked up and concentrated
authority in existing institutions as in the incorporation of village
39 Reports of the Joint Commission, p 124.  Established hence in a higher
appellate role, the courts could dispute the procedures of caste institutions
without directly taking issue with the institutions.  A decision of a
smartavicharam, excommunicating a woman and a man she had implicated,
was taken to and overruled by the High Court in Madras on the grounds
virtually that the smartavicharam had not observed procedures acceptable
to the civil courts.  The High Court held that “the plaintiff [the
excommunicated man] not having been charged, nor having had an
opportunity to cross-examine the woman, or enter on his defence, and
otherwise vindicate his character… the defendants had not acted bonafide
in making the declaration”.  Indian Law Reports (Madras Series) 12, 1889
cited in Thurston and Rangachari, Caste and Tribes, p 224.  In an earlier
instance where the court took on a supervisory role, O. Chandu Menon
describes a caste-based procedure for determining guilt (an ordeal of the
balance) that he witnessed at Calicut around 1876 when he was Sub Judge
of Canara.  This was in connection with a suit before the Sub Court at
Calicut to determine whether a Nambudiri, who was party to the suit, had
lost caste for breach of some caste rule.  The ordeal was well attended and
ended in “so much confusion and uproar that many officials including
myself were unable to see how exactly the scales stood; but the judges
[Brahman priests who officiated as judges] loudly and vehemently declared
in favour of the poor accused”. K.P. Padmanabha Menon, History of Kerala,
pp 267-270.
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heads (as adhikaris or patels) in the lower rungs of the
administration.40
The manner of shift effected on the question of laws and customs
to be applied to the people was more complicated by the pressures of
social governance.  However, officials were predisposed to see the
division of topics of law in terms of the contemporary English division.41
A division in English law between private and public shaped the category
of personal laws, which were to govern the ‘private’ realm of family,
marriage and inheritance.42   On these topics the courts were to go by the
former laws of the people, whether shastric or customary.43   Officials, in
the greater part of India, took on the task of determining ‘Hindu law’ in
accordance with the shastras, resorting variously to existing smritis or
commentaries and to commentaries/codes developed by select pandits
40 The village heads selected were in most cases former hereditary authorities
and they were vested with powers to try minor civil and criminal cases.  In
such cases “the economic sanctions for his political and juridical authority
nevertheless remain, and to these are added the sanctions issuing from his
position in the modern administration”.  Miller, ‘Village in North Kerala’, p 49.
The physical structure of legal justice took clearer shape in 1845
with the establishment of the Civil and Sessions Courts at Tellicherry and
Calicut, the Subordinate Court of Calicut and the Principal Sudr Amins’
Courts (in 1875 the Principal Sudr Amins were designated Subordinate
judges) at Tellicherry and Cochin.  The District Munsiff’s Court continued
to function, while the Provincial courts and Zillah courts of the early
nineteenth century were abolished. Re-organisation continued into the
twentieth century.  Innes, Malabar Gazetteers, p 384.
41 J. Duncan M. Derrett: Religion, Law and the State in India (Delhi: Oxford
University Press, 1999), p 233.
42 Tanika Sarkar, ‘Rhetoric against Age of Consent: Colonial Reason and
Death of a Child Wife’, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol 28 (26), 1993,
p 1869.
43 Derrett: Religion, Law and the State, p 234.
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under government instruction.44    Several scholars have pointed to the
official presumption in favour of written/shastric law. 45   Where  shastric
law was recognized, this did away with the distinction between written
law and custom.46   However textual authority was introduced in the
interpretation of custom, not based on written sources as well.47   In
Malabar and South Canara, besides the textual authority ascribed to
customary practices, written codes too were to intrude into the
interpretation of custom.48   Derrett suggests the kind of influence that
44 Derrett discusses the ‘making’ of colonial Hindu law and the elusive search
for a definitive code. Ibid, pp 225-74.
45 Ibid, pp 233-35, Lucy Carroll: ‘Colonial Perceptions of Indian Society and
the Emergence of Caste(s) associations’, Journal of Asian Studies, Vol 37,
no 2, p 237.  It has been noted that the very general adoption of ‘Hindu’
(book) law led gradually to erosion of customary law. Carroll: ‘Law, Custom
and Statutory Social Reform: The Hindu Widows Remarriage Act of 1856’,
in J. Krishnamurthy (ed.) Women in Colonial India: Essays in Survival,
Women and the State, (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1989) p 2.  Madhu
Kishwar: ‘Codified Hindu Law: Myth and Reality’, Economic and Political
Weekly, Vol 29, no 33, (1994) p 2145.
46 Carroll, ‘Law, Custom and Statutory Social Reform’.  See also Kishwar’s
insightful discussion of how the authors of the smritis discuss the contingency,
variability and flexibility of the precepts they lay out and speak of the
importance of custom as distinct from these precepts.  ‘Codified Hindu
Law’, pp 2147-48.
47 Significantly, the Punjab case was seen as closer to English common law
and posed against the Bengal tradition of shastric law, which was based on
written sources and clearly textual.  British officials then drew upon the
English common law theorists and nineteenth century anthropologists to
develop a theory of the evolution of Punjab’s society.  Bhattacharya,
‘Remaking Custom’, p 26.
48 Notably, the Malabar Marriage Commission validates the resort to custom
as if it were a consequence of the absence of written sources.   Hence it has
to first dismiss the claims of the Kerala Mahatmayam, a well known text in
Malabar.  Ibid, p 10.  In an instructive variation, the Aliya Santanada Kattu
Kattale was relied on as an authoritative account of matrilineal customs in
South Canara until it was declared a fraud by the court.  Several important
decisions of the High Court were based on it and in a case in 1883 though
the Chief Justice noted that its “authority had been seriously impunged”, he
based his judgement on a precedent that relied on the book. Moore, Malabar
Law, p 83.
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was ear marked for written sources in Malabar.  “Though the Malayalam
Vyavahara-mala… says nothing about the British, it seems certain that
it was written to provide a book-law for the Malayalam-speaking
inhabitants of Malabar at a time when they returned to relative self-
government after the East India Company acquired the Malabar District
from Tipu Sultan… The Malayalam law-book was available in 1800”.49
Noticing a considerable sastric element in the text, the bulk of which
concerned contracts and customs relating to Malabar, or Kerala, he adds
that
[t]here is no likelihood that such a work would have been
written but for the presence of the British rulers and their
notions of how local law should be found out and
administered.  And the attempt to give the whole system,
including maxims of wisdom, legal procedure, land-tenure
and rent questions, was evidently based upon the theory
that if local laws could be made out the rulers would have
them applied.  And so in fact it turned out, by and large,
in Malabar, more than in any other district of the Madras
Presidency, though we cannot attribute this decisively to
the law-book itself.  The text, he points out, reflected
colonial notions of how local law should be found out
and administered.50   (emphasis added).
49 Derrett, Religion, Law and the State, p 262.
50 “Bengal works” of the shastras were copied and studied in Kerala, almost
certainly in the early years of British rule “before civil procedure had
commenced on its Anglo-Indian path” and Jonathan Duncan, one of the
Joint Commissioners who reported on Malabar, wanted the ‘Gentoo Code’,
the first major colonial digest on Hindu law published in 1776, to be
consulted in Malabar.  Ibid, p 242, pp 257-263.
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Though the treatise was not drawn upon in arbitration of cases or
legal theorizing, ‘Malabar law’ was incorporated into influential treatises
of ‘Hindu law’ that found immediate reference with judges.51
Issues of Matrilineal Practice: A Critical Review
It is only in recent years that the scholarship on matriliny has
addressed the interpretation of customs by the colonial civil courts as
an aspect of the transformation of matriliny.52   Much of the research on
matriliny in Kerala has come from the discipline of anthropology.53
Clearly within a discursive frame, this literature tended to generalize a
view of matriliny garnered from the socio-economic configuration of
one region, central Kerala.  Nambudiri settlements were concentrated in
51 John Mayne’s Hindu Law and T.L. Strange’s Manual of Hindu Law were
referred to by judges and compilers of Malabar and Aliyasantana law to
bolster interpretations.   See for instance Moore, Malabar Law.
52 K. Saradamoni: Matriliny Transformed: Family, Law and Ideology in
Twentieth Century Travancore, New Delhi, 1999, pp 66-70. G. Arunima,
‘Multiple Meanings, Changing Conceptions of Matrilineal Kinship in
Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Malabar’, The Indian Economic and
Social History Review, Vol 33 (3), 1996, pp 283-307, and ‘A Vindication of
the Rights of Women: Families and Legal Change in Nineteenth-Century
Malabar’, in Micheal Anderson and Sumit Guha eds. Changing Concepts of
Rights and Justice in South Asia, New Delhi, 1998, pp 114-39.
53 The most extensive is the work of Kathleen Gough, who documents also
regional and social group based variations.  See ‘Nayar: Central Kerala’;
‘Nayar: North Kerala’; ‘Tiya: North Kerala’; ‘Mappilas: North Kerala’; and
‘The Modern Disintegration of Matrilineal Descent Groups’, in Schneider
and Gough (ed.) Matrilineal Kinship.   ‘Changing Kinship Usages in the
Setting of Political and Economic Change among the Nayars of Malabar’,
Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol 82, 1952. Joan Mencher,
‘The Nayars of South Malabar’, in M. F. Nimkoff (ed.) Comparative Family
Systems, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965).  C. J. Fuller, The Nayars Today,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976).  Melinda Moore, ‘Taravad:
House, Land and Relationship in a Hindu Matrilineal Society’, Unpublished
Dissertation, Department of Anthropology, University of Chicago at Illinois,
(1983).
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central Kerala and I have argued elsewhere that this factor shaped the
central Kerala experience of matriliny and land relations.54   In the taluks
of north Malabar (as also South Canara and southern Travancore), the
nature of tenancy, cropping pattern and matriliny were different from
the central Kerala (south Malabar, Cochin and the north Travancore)
pattern.55
Importantly, Kathleen Gough is keenly aware of these differences
leading her to treat matrilineal kinship north and central Kerala
separately.56   However this does not prevent Gough from generalizing
matriliny in terms of the central Kerala experience and positing a uniform
trajectory of change, beginning with the entry of land into the market in
the colonial period.57   She , accommodates departure from law/‘rules’ in
a distinction between the ‘formal’ structure of ‘traditional’ matrilineal
kinship and ‘informal’ practices.  Crucially, however, Gough was
retrieving ‘traditional’ matriliny, in the mid-twentieth century, when the
influence of colonial definitions of customs in local understanding of/
author’s retrieval of practices cannot be underestimated.  There are
54 See Praveena Kodoth, ‘Courting Legitimacy or Delegitimising Custom?’, p
10.
55 There were only two settlements of Nambuidris in north Kerala in Payyanur
(a matrilineal settlement) and Taliparamba in Chirakkal taluk and their
influence in the region was less than in the south Malabar/central Kerala,
reflected in differences in land and marriage practices.  For a fuller discussion
see Praveena Kodoth, ‘Women and Property Rights: A Study of Land
Relations and Personal Law in Malabar, 1880 – 1940’ Unpublished Ph. D.
Dissertation, Department of Economics, University of Hyderabad, (1998),
p 127-35. Variation in cultivation regimes and tenures of north and south
Malabar is discussed in Ravindran Gopinath, ‘Garden and Paddy Fields’.
56 She points out that the failure to distinguish between regions had given rise
to much confusion.  ‘Nayar: Central Kerala’, p 305.
57 Gough, ‘The Modern Disintegration of Matrilineal Descent Groups’, p
640.
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suggestions of the assumption of colonial interpretations as law.  For
instance, Gough writes that gifts of land occasionally by men in north
Malabar “to their wives and children was known long before the colonial
period, although they were against the law.” 58  (emphasis added)  While
the law on this point, long before the colonial period, is unclear and
certainly not addressed by Gough, nineteenth century colonial law
permitted alienation of only ‘separate’ property and only during a
person’s lifetime.59  Colonial law was also distinctly uneasy on the
question of transfer of property from husband and father to wife and
children, a discomfort that Gough too displays in understanding such
practice in a structural frame. 60   There are several such instances in her
work where custom brushes uneasily against the ‘law’.61
Gough’s engagement with the significant authority that senior
women seem to have had over property and kin is instructive.  The
senior woman, Gough indicates, was not necessarily determined by
seniority and might well be the oldest competent woman and yet seniority
was a crucial factor in determining power relations between the
karanavan and the senior woman.62   If the karanavan was the son or
58 Gough, ‘Nayars: North Kerala’, pp 391-92.
59 This was until the Malabar Wills Act, 1898 and the Malabar Marriage Act,
1896 came into effect.  Even prior to this however the courts were known
to have upheld marumakkatayam wills.  Moore, Malabar Law, p 182.
60 Putravakasam, which referred to the certain claims that children had to
their father’s property, did not have the force of law but several respondents
to the Malabar Marriage Commission attest to its prevalence particularly in
north Malabar.  RMMC II, p 271.
61 Gough writes of north Kerala that when a junior man leased land on
kuzhikanam (uncultivated waste or forest land taken on tenancy) from his
taravad, the improvements that he made on it “might by custom although
not by law become the separate property of his mother’s matrilineal
descendents”. (emphasis added) ‘Nayars: North Kerala’, p 391.
62 Gough, ‘Nayars: Central Kerala’, pp 338-41.
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younger brother of the senior woman, “she might indeed be the de facto
head of the group” keeping accounts in her own hands and counseling
him; but were he the older brother of the senior woman then she was
subordinate to him.63   Do we have a suggestion of the historical
contingency of authority and practice?
More recently, Arunima has argued that the identifiers of matrilineal
kinship in colonial law such as residence, impartibility and the
inalienability of property were not essential parts of customary practice
in pre-colonial Malabar and that the colonial interpretation of matriliny
often militated against the rights that were historically available,
particularly to women and junior members, within the taravad.64
Contending rightly that matrilineal kinship needs to be historicized,
she fails however to address historical changes and regional distinctions
in inheritance, marriage, residence or descent beyond speculating on
how taravads were established and took on distinct ‘caste’ and political
identities in the precolonial period. Her argument, based partly on an
attempt to retrieve precolonial practice, is fraught with problems.
As Arunima points out the crucial difference lay in that descent
was traced from women.  And it is perhaps in having to reconcile this
and the possibility of women’s agency arising from this, with the
‘structural’ patriarchy of the karanavan, that the tensions so evident in
Gough’s work arise.  However several of Arunima’s inferences are
questionable.  Take for instance her claim that in early colonial north
Malabar women had rights to management of the taravad, where the
‘evidence’ that she cites reveals only that Nair women managed domestic
63 Ibid,  pp 341-42.
64 Arunima, ‘A Vindication of the Rights’, pp 116-19.
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affairs in their natal taravads.65   As Bina Agarwal has noted, this much is
evident from Gough, who documents the senior woman’s decision-
making role in the inner domain of larger taravads in central and north
Kerala.66   It must also be noted that besides the legal discourse, ethno-
historical writing produced under colonial rule and post-colonial
ethnography, there is little to suggest that the senior male had absolute
powers in the taravad.  A critical reading of the above discourses could
raise the possibility suggested by Ehrenfels that unlike in patrilineal
families there was more than one node of power and a plural authority
structure.67
Arunima’s claim that by the eighteenth century most new taravads
were set up by women undermines her own later recognition of the
several ways in which taravads  were set up in the eighteenth as against
65 Arunima cites Francis Buchanan’s early nineteenth century travelogue.
Arunima, ‘A Vindication of the Rights’, p 118.  Contrary to twentieth
century anthropological wisdom, Buchanan records, that a woman in north
Malabar could return to take up permanent residence in her natal taravad
only on the death of her husband or on having been turned out of her
husband’s taravad.  On the other hand, a woman could not divorce her
husband.  Perhaps a crucial factor here is that the information was gleaned
exclusively from some principal men of the area. Francis Buchanan, A
Journey from Madras through the Countries of Mysore, Canara and Malabar,
Vol II, (Madras: Asian Educational Services, 1988), p 513.   The Joint
Commissioners cite a report furnished by the Chirakkal Raja, which indicates
that there were greater constraints on women in north Kerala in relation to
marriage.  Report of the Joint Commissioners, p 234.
66 Gough: ‘Nayars: Central Kerala’, pp 337-41 and  ‘Nayars: North Kerala’ p
397.  Bina Agarwal, A Field of One’s Own: Gender and Land Rights in
South Asia, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p 113.
67 The mother, as the center of the family, the mother’s brother, as legal
adviser and representative to outsiders and the father as of psychological
importance an honoured guest and outsider.  U.R. Von Ehrenfels, ‘Matrilineal
Joint Family Patterns in India’, George Kurien (ed.) The Family in India: A
Regional View, (The Hague: Mouton, 1974), p 95. Gough records the
limited but important customary rights of the father in North Kerala.  Gough,
‘Nayars: North Kerala’, pp 400-02.
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the provisions of colonial law in the nineteenth century.68  If Gough and
Melinda Moore document that taravads or tavazhis (branches of
taravads) were set up in a number of ways, Moore also finds that it was
comparatively rare for a remembered founder of a taravad to be a woman
alone.69
That in some wealthy taravads lands were set aside for women as
stanum (a special status) property or otherwise over which they enjoyed
varied claims does not in any way suggest ‘separate rights’ or “access to
their own separate revenues and properties”.70   For even evidence of
women having sold their share of taravad property in the pre colonial
period does not provide insights into the nature or dimensions of the
ability to transfer land by taravads or their members separately.71   To
suggest that women (or men) had separate rights in a uni-dimensional
68 Arunima, ‘A Vindication of the Rights’, p 117, ‘Multiple Meanings’, p 291.
She takes the establishment of the Nileswaram royal family, when “a princess
from the Samuthiri’s family eloped with a prince from Kolathanad to establish
her own dynasty”, as an instance of “the common enough strategy of
establishing taravads through elopement or marriage”.  In doing so, Arunima
interprets rather drastically Sreedhara Menon’s account of the establishment
of the family prior to Portuguese arrival in Kerala.  For Menon writes that
as a consequence of elopement, the princess and her descendants were
denied the right to a share in the Samudiri’s property and that the Samudiri
used the threat of arms to force the Raja of Kolathanad to create a separate
estate for the princess at Nileswaram.  See A. Sreedhara Menon, A Survey of
Kerala History, (Kottayam: National Book Stall, 1970) p 181.
69 Gough, ‘Nayars: North Kerala’, 391-393.  Moore, ‘Taravad: House, Land’,
pp 121-39.  Moore notes that branches may split off for different reasons
including fall from caste, quarrels or the desire of a husband to endow his
wife and children.  Ibid, p 145
70 Arunima, ‘Multiple Meanings’, p 292.
71 Deed no. 35 in Logan’s collection refers to a transfer by sale in 1739 by two
women Kurikkalote Palakkal Mittalevittil Ummanga and Uchchira, of ‘as
far as their share of the Tara, kandam (fields) and swamps below their
house’.  Logan, Malabar, Vol II, p cxlvii.
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sense has the unwarranted consequence of projecting back into the pre
colonial period a conception of rights that formed the basis of the colonial
interpretation of matriliny (discussed later on in this paper).
The Legal Discourse on Matriliny
I adhere most strongly to the opinion that where a rule of
law indisputably exists it is the duty of the judges not to
fritter it away on the specious pretense of bringing rules
of law into harmony with what they may consider the
requirements of society.  If they are wrong in their view of
such requirement… the evil is unmixed, if right, the
mischief still predominates over the good because it
prevents that systemic reform from which alone good can
result.  Such systemic reform is for the legislature.
William Holloway 72
It was in the second half of the nineteenth century that
marumakkatayam began to take sharp legal contours, coeval with
increasing conflict over legal interpretations.   This section will look at
the interpretation of specific customs that determined the nature and
extent of women’s and men’s functions of authority and rights to property
in the legal discourse.  Interpretation of conventional marriage, very
generally referred to as sambandham, has not been addressed here. Yet
as differences in property rights are so closely associated with the
organization of marriage, it bears mention that one of the reasons why
the civil courts refused to recognise  sambandham as marriage was that
it did not establish property rights — the assumption of course being
72 Munda Chetti v Timmaju Hensu, 1862-63, p 383.
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that the establishment of (patrilineal) property rights was a defining
incident of marriage.73
The Right against Partition
Though a decision against partition was confirmed as early as in
1814, the provincial courts continued to allow it until the mid nineteenth
century, when the higher courts ruled against it.74  Two seemingly
divergent explanations were advanced for the ‘right against partition’.
The understanding of the taravad in analogy with the impartible “archaic
Hindu family” avoided any reference to matriliny or to women.  In his
compilation of Hindu Law, John D. Mayne places the taravad at the
stage corresponding to the “antique Patriarchal form”, of the modern
Hindu family, whereby “the doctrine that property was by birth – in a
sense that each son was the equal of his father – had then no existence…
The son was a mere appendage to his father, and had no rights to property
as opposed to him”.  In doing so he generalizes Henry Maine’s Patriarchal
Theory, formulated in his Ancient Law.  This validated impartibility
except by common consent i.e., “no one member, nor even all but one
can enforce a division upon any who object.”75   Hence each one had a
right to resist division — an individual right in the last instance.  The
notion of collective rights, said to govern the taravad, was trapped
conceptually in a polarisation of rights between individual and collective
7 3 The colonial interpretation of sambandham raises distinct and complex
issues of sexuality, property and legitimacy that have been addressed in
Praveena Kodoth, ‘Courting Legitimacy or Delegitimising Custom?
74 Moore, Malabar Law, p 13, p 16.   Munda Chetti v Timmaju Hensu, p 380.
75 Moore, Malabar Law, p 17.
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rights, which, a) turned necessarily on a form of individual right and b)
excluded the very possibility of different bases of claims. 76
However, William Holloway, who along with Herbert Wigram was
a driving force in giving a sharp legal outline to the taravad, invoked
matriliny and women as determining factors of the rule of impartibility.
In a case that established impartibility as custom, the judges disallowed
a plea for division under aliyasantana law, which had come up before
the High Court in 1862. 77   The plaintiff, a woman, sought division and
the District Munsiff ruled in her favour generally but disallowed her
claim to a piece of land on the ground that it had been shown to be the
self acquisition of the second defendant.  Both parties appealed against
the decision and the Principal Sadr Amin awarded to the plaintiff the
entire lands claimed in the plaint.
In a special appeal before the High Court, the appellants contended
that under the rules of aliyasantana, division could not be legally
enforced.  Noting that neither the District Munsiff nor the Principal Sadr
Amin had pronounced an opinion on this point, the High Court remitted
the issue to the Civil Judge for evidence of existing usage.  The Civil
Judge observed that division of family property had been allowed in
numerous suits since 1825.  This however did not deter the judges Frere
and Holloway from denying such a usage.
Frere contended that division at the behest of individual members
is “undoubtedly at direct variance with the ancient law on the subject”.
76 Sundara Aiyar points out that the nature of the rule was due to the British
courts for it was extremely unlikely that a single member should have been
given the right against the will of the majority in the taravad to resist
partition. A Treatise on  Malabar Law, pp 11-13.
77 Munda Chetti v Timmaju Hensu, p 380-83.
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He goes on to consider whether the “ancient law… had been superseded
by any custom or usage which has by long prescription or usage acquired
the form of law” and finds that the precedents submitted by the Civil
Judge concerned division in favour of males, i.e., “in none does the
question of compulsory division between the females who alone are
recognized as the proprietors of the family estate, appear to have been
judicially tried and decided”.78   Holloway however was decisive in
rejecting the claim to division.
The divisibility of family property in Canara is one of
those propositions, which fall within the category of law
taken for granted, and is found when examined to have
no solid foundation... [I]t has not been disputed, as indeed
it could not be, that the compulsory division of the family
property is wholly opposed to the authorities upon which
the Aliya Santana system of inheritance rests.  It is  equally
opposed to the principles of that system which vests
property in the females of the family....79   (emphasis added)
The rule against partition is seen as deriving from a system that
vested property in women.80   For we might also ask as Sundara Aiyar
does, how could it be said that non-division followed logically from
succession through females?  “And even if it did the question is not
78 Ibid, p 382.
79 Ibid, p 383.
80 Against division, both judges cite the authority of the Aliyasantanda Kattu
Kattle or Bhutala Pandya’s Kattoo, later denounced as a forgery.  The text
asserted that if a disagreement took place between sisters, the eldest sister
was to provide the younger sister with a separate house and its necessary
apparatus, retaining the general managership and the performance of
ceremonies.  In his judgment, Holloway interpreted this to constitute far
from a claim to division a “positive authority against it” Ibid .
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logical plausibility or perfection but what were the usages among the
communities who are governed by it?”81   Clearly then, despite or
precisely because of the implicit connection between women and
matriliny, the colonial discourse on matriliny was not about matriliny
or women but about what comprised ‘authentic’ custom.82
Targeting precisely the right against partition, the plaintiffs in a
case in 1870 staked their claim to the property of another taravad with
whom they shared descent.83   The defendants maintained that while
they had descended from a “common stock”, their taravad and the
plaintiff’s were distinct.  Given the way matrilineal law was developed
with the emphasis on denying partition, a decision against the plaintiff
could have meant affirming partition.  In denying the contention of the
plaintiff, holding it to be a case where one of several branches had
become better off and another, “by virtue of ambiguity of a word” had
sought to reap the benefits, Holloway argued that,
As in all Hindu law so in the archaic form of it, which
exists in Malabar, the first conception of the family is of
an indissoluble unit, a mere aggregate with no separate
rights... In Malabar as elsewhere, the inconvenience of
this state of things has made itself felt and families... have
split into various branches.
81 Sundara Aiyar, A Treatise on Malabar Law, p 13.
82 Lata Mani has argued that the debate on sati reconstituted tradition, such
that all parties to the debate invoked the ‘authenticity’ of a particular corpus
of texts – the shastras – in defence of and against the practice of sati.
Despite the intimate connection between women and tradition in the colonial
discourse on sati, the debate was not about women but about what constituted
authentic tradition.  Lata Mani, ‘Contentious Traditions: The Debate on Sati
in Colonial India’, in Sangari and Vaid (ed.) Recasting Women, pp 88-126.
83 Erambapalli Korapen Nayar v Erambapalli Chenen Nayar, Regular Appeal
no. 120 of 1870, MHCR 4, (1870-71), p 411.
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To validate the existence of formerly-partitioned taravads,
however, he calls to his aid the local concepts of mudal sambandham
(community of property) and pula sambandham (community of
pollution) and contends that the movement from mudal sambandham
to pula sambandham was one of divisions.   Yet, acknowledging that
divisions had occurred along tavazhis did not lead to a search for a
different basis for partition or to questioning the doctrine of ‘common
consent’.84  On the contrary, stipulations were set to identify formerly
partitioned taravads.  In a decree upheld by the High Court, 40 years of
separation was held as sufficient to prove effective partition the burden
of proof resting with those claiming common descent.85
Residence and Maintenance
It was assumed that under matriliny women necessarily resided in
their matrilineal homes even after entering into a marriage.  In north
84 In the early decades of the twentieth century, demands for partition were
along the lines of tavazhis,.  Making out a case for tavazhi partition, T.
Vasudeva Raja pointed out that “…Malabar is merely suffering from arrested
growth, and the administration of law by the courts constituted by the
British government on principles recognized in English jurisprudence is in
no small degree responsible for this stunting process.”  Home (Judicial)
Department, 60-62, (1912), National Archives of India, New Delhi.  U.C.S.
Bhatt, member of the Madras Legislative Council from South Canara, argued
that it had been routine to partition taravads until the High Court ruled
against it in the mid nineteenth century.  Proceedings of the Madras Legislative
Council, Vol 59 (Jan 10, 1932), p 205.  Importantly, Melinda Moore studies
several taravad histories to indicate that branches may split off for different
reasons including fall from caste, quarrels or the desire of a husband to
endow his wife and children.  ‘Taravad: House, Land’, p 145.  See also an
account of partition in a dispute stretching over four years and settled
through the lower courts in 1856 in K.T. Gopindranath, K.T. Chandu Nambiar,
(Kannur: S.C. Printers, 1996), p 85 and K.K.N. Kurup (ed.) Koodali
Granthavari, (Calicut: Calicut University, 1995), p xviii.
85 Moore, Malabar Law, p 19.   In the early twentieth century it was held that
in a proper case, in the interests of family peace and order a partition may
be supported as a family arrangement. Parakkateri v Koran 1912, in Sundara
Aiyar, A Treatise on Malabar, p 15.   Further, it was held in a case in 1916
that “separate residence, separate assessment and separate management are
the common indicators of partition”. Ibid, p 17.
35
Malabar and South Canara however women resided in the matrilineal
homes of their husbands during the tenure of their marriage.  This point
was not taken to court and tried directly.  However, in a case before the
District Judge of North Malabar in 1878, a woman and her son claimed
maintenance from the karanavan.  The claim included maintenance for
the wife and children of the son. The defendant, the karanavan, pleaded
that the plaintiffs were not entitled to maintenance as they had declined
to live in the house that he had allotted to them.  The judge went on to
disallow maintenance to the wife and children of the son on the grounds
that it was against the ‘principles of marumakkatayam law’, a point that
was not even at issue.86   Previously, the Subordinate Judge, who did not
take objection to the inclusion of the son’s wife and children, had ruled
in favour of the plaintiffs.  He did so on the grounds that the house in
question was already occupied by 11 members and had no spare
accommodation.  The plaintiffs took the case to the High Court, where
the judge remitted the case to the lower court for more information.  On
the basis of information received, the judge held that the claim was a
proper one.  It was pointed out that even the first defendant did not
object to the custom of wives and children of men living in the
husband’s/father’s taravads.   However the court upheld this in the mode
of an exception.
Although it would seem inconsistent with the principles
of the marumakkatayam law that the tarawad should
contribute to the maintenance of the ladies with whom
the male members cohabit and of the issue of such
cohabitation,... it is urged in this Court that it is the practice
of the country in North Malabar for females to reside
86 Varikara Vadake Vittil Valiya Parvati v Varikara Vadake Vittil Kamaran Nayar,
Indian Law Reports (all references are to the Madras Series) (henceforth
ILR), Vol 6, (1883), p 341.
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during the whole year in the tarawad of the male with
whom they cohabit,... (emphasis added).
In a sweeping move the practice of women residing in their natal
taravads after marriage, specific to south Malabar, was generalised to
matriliny itself.
More generally, the accent on co-residence and impartibility meant
that legally the karanavan could refuse requests for separate
maintenance, outside the allocated taravad house, or even flexible
maintenance arrangements within the household.  However this is one
area where over half a century the claims of junior members to
maintenance found increasing support in the civil courts. 87
Dismissing a suit for separate maintenance in the District Court in
Tellicherry in 1858, the judge had observed that
[t]he junior members of the family are not entitled to be
supported out of the family house from the family
property… To give them a cause of action, they must
have alleged, and to succeed, they must have proved, that
by the acts of their karanavan they were deprived of
subsistence in their own family house. 88   (emphasis added).
87 In 1881 when a senior woman of a taravad refused to give up her possession
of a room in the house, the karanavan sued.  He maintained that he has the
right to redistribute rooms in the house and the judge held upheld his claim
on the ground that the powers of the karanavan were absolute.  Moore,
Malabar Law, p 121.  However in 1917, a woman living in a separate room
in the family house owing to scruples about cooking fish was allowed
separate maintenance.  It was held that, “[w]hen a state of things has gone
on for a number of years without objection, it may be unreasonable on the
part of the karanavan to terminate it arbitrarily”.  Sundara Aiyar, A Treatise
on Malabar Law, p 139.
88 Moore, Malabar Law, p 124.
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By the 1880s suits for maintenance were more successful indicating not
so much a change in the provisions of the law as the widening of the
scope of disputes, the adjudication of which pushed at the boundaries
of earlier interpretations.  Pleas for separate maintenance were successful
as “rare exceptions… as the karanavan has been the cause of quarrels
that necessitate the plaintiff leaving the family house”.89   A judgement
in 1882 directed that members were entitled to claim maintenance if
there was no room for them in the taravad house.90   In this case it was
decided also that if the karanavan made insufficient allowance, members
of the taravad  could apply to the court to determine what was sufficient
in the context of family circumstances and to a raise in allowance when
the family wealth increased.
The Rule of the Karanavan and Women’s Rights to Manage
Property
As the ‘general’ rule in Malabar, management and control of
property was vested in the senior male of the taravad, against which
management by women was framed as an ‘exception’.  Except in the
case of the kovilagams (royal families), management by women was
held to be “opposed to the present usage of every other Nayar family in
Malabar”.91  In the karanavan, the eldest male of the taravad, was “vested
actually (though in theory in the females), all the property movable and
89 The maintenance granted, viz., two rupees per mensem it was stated was
intended to discourage such applications.  Peru Nayar v Ayappan Nayar,
Ibid, p 128.
90 Ibid, p 132.
9 1 Ibid, p 121.  The right of the senior woman to management was recognized
in the Calicut and Walluvanad kovilagams (residences of royal families),
each of which had separate estates attached to it.  The senior woman of the
family (of the three kovilagams) was entitled to its management.  Ibid, pp
343-345.
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immovable belonging to the taravad.”92   Taking the presumption in
favour of men a step further, in matters such as sales of taravad property,
where there was an adult anandiravan his consent was required even
when the sale was assented to by a female member and was shown to be
for taravad necessity.93
As the legal executor of the taravad, the karanavan was seen to
represent it in its relations with people outside the taravad, importantly
tenants or possible buyers of property. Land was the most important
form of property among the matrilineal social groups in Malabar.  Control
over land also meant a degree of control over certain groups of people,
tenants, labourers and service (artisan) castes.  Possession, control or
management of land was understood in terms of the roles of land owners
and / or tenants as janmis, kanakkar or verumpattamkkar (cultivating
tenants) and facilitated, inevitably, their coming together with the
karanavanmar of taravads.
The powers of the karanavan were seen as growing out of his
position as ‘head of family’. However in assuming that the karanavan
was indeed a ‘head of family’, it is evident that the legal discourse drew
upon a theory of law rather than on local practice.  In a case before the
High Court in 1872 in which the custody of a child was in dispute,
Morgan and Holloway held that,
by the principles of the laws of Malabar, the mother herself,
while alive, and her children too, were under the
guardianship of the head of the family, the Karanavan.
92 Varankot Narayanan Nambudiri v Varanakot Narayanan Nambudiri, ILR 2,
(1878-81), p 328.
93 Sundara Aiyar, A Treatise on Malabar Law, p 63.
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Their position was precisely analogous to that of the
members of a Roman family under the patria potestas.
The Karanavan is as much the guardian and representative,
for all purposes of property, of every member within the
taravad as the Roman father or grandfather.94
The  Civil Judge had drawn upon criminal law, which required the
father of a child unable to maintain itself to maintain it, and “the natural
equity found in positive law” to entitle the father to guardianship of his
children.  The High Court reversed the order on the grounds that it was
“wholly opposed to the very principles upon which Marumakkatayam
depends”.95   In a later case, Morgan and Holloway held that the “person
to whom the karanavan had the closest resemblance is the father of a
Hindu family” and that like the latter, his position as head of family
“comes to him by birth”.  The karanavan’s “office is not conferred by
trust or contract but is the offspring of his natural condition”.96   These
cases laid the field for understanding the position of authority of the
karanavan in relation to all other members of the taravad.  Clearly, the
karanavan’s position was natural because he was in the position of the
father.  Further, both these judgments show that the authority of the
karanavan  was posed not as ‘natural’ or internal to matriliny but derived
through an imputed relation with a ‘patriarch’ as ‘head of family’.
The practice of setting aside property for the maintenance of
women in Nair taravads, which property they were entitled to manage,
94 Thathu Baputty v Chayakath Chathu, Civil Miscellaneous Regular Appeal
no. 406 of 1872, MHCR 7 (1871-74), p 179.
95 Ibid, p 181.
96 Eravanni Revivarman V Ittapu Revivarman, ILR 1, (1876-78), p 153.
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was disallowed by the High Court in the middle of the nineteenth
century.97  Among the bigger taravads, property was sometimes set aside
specifically for the maintenance of women and children, though the
arrangements differed from one family to another.98   In a suit brought
against the Kavalapara Valia Nair (also referred to as the Moopil or
senior Nair) by his sister the Valia Kava Nethiar, in the 1850s, even the
defendant and his witnesses maintained that it was the practice to set
aside properties separately for the maintenance of women, which was
under the control of the senior woman.   If the senior woman found this
inadequate and informed him, the Moopil Nair, usually paid the deficit.
It was pointed out that the senior woman also received 1000 fanams
from the 16000 fanams received as malikhana by the Moopil Nair.99
The general presumption in favour of management by the senior
male was all too often turned into an exclusion of women from managerial
roles or used to exhaust women’s claims. To establish a custom against
97 Moore, Malabar Law, p 347.  Moore points out that the practice was adopted
by certain Nair families of distinction until disallowed by the High Court in
Kondi Menon v Vadakentil Kunni Penna, where a distinction was claimed
between property set apart for women and the common taravad property.
The notion of striswothu (women’s property) came up in arbitration and it
was held to be “known to marumakkatayam and not invalid”.  Only written
evidence, however could establish the right. Bivi Umah v Keloth Chiriyath
Kutti, S.A. no. 932 of 1894, Madras Weekly Notes (MWN) (1919), pp 693-
94.  Puthelath Chatti Soopi v C.V. Kannan Nair, MWN, (1929), pp 873-77.
98 Commentators on custom have pointed out that a considerable portion of
the janmam property of taravads was set aside for women and children and
that women had access to the management of such property.   For instance
see ‘Stanaswothu’, Janmi, Edavam (May-June), 1908.
9 9 K.K.N.Kurup (ed.), Kavalappara  Papers, (Calicut: Calicut University Press,
1984), pp 20-24.  The Moopil Nair had opposed his sister’s claim to
maintenance while she resided at one of the many family residences on the
grounds that it was not the usual residence of the women of the family.
Contrary to the stance of the courts in later years, the Valia Kava Nethiar was
held entitled to her claim.
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the ‘general’ custom of management by the senior male, the ‘evidence’
produced had to conform to certain requirements.  For instance, it was
not enough to argue that, “the woman has always been the manager.  To
establish a custom contrary to the general customs of the country, the
clearest evidence is required”.100   This implied that a defence of practice
as practice could be dismissed as constituting “vague statements” rather
than “proof”.101
But what constituted clear evidence? The turn of interpretation
on this point is indicated in an appeal suit before Holloway in 1855
wherein the Munsif had held that the authority over a paramba (garden)
resided in the female and not in the male members. 102  Looking at
documents including one dated 1822-23, Holloway pointed out that as
the names had been obliterated it was not clear from them that the
former karanavatti, Ittiyachi, had been the one to demise the paramba
(garden) on tenancy.  But, he argues, even if this were clear “it would
indeed be a violent inference that therefore the authority resides in
women only”. Not pausing to consider whether authority could have
been more inclusive and contingent, he suggests that, “it may well be
that from the incapacity of males from tender age the woman was
karanavatti in her life-time”. According to him, the weight of the evidence
clearly showed that the grantor of the janmam, Rama Panikar, had
succeeded Ittiyachi.  What was this force of evidence?   Holloway inferred
that since Rama Panikar had been paying revenue on the paramba he
had authority over it.  Such acts as the payment of revenue “would
carefully have been avoided if the truth were that in this family females
100 Moore, Malabar Law, p 121.
101 Zillah Decisions, March 1857 in Ibid.
102 A.S. 299 of 1855 in Moore in Ibid.
42
had the management of some portions of the property and males of
others.  The separation in all acts of ownership would have been most
carefully enforced” (emphasis added).103   It could of course be asked
whether payment of revenue was a determinate marker of control, indeed
of ‘ownership’ itself.  By the time the Malabar Marriage Commission
took evidence in 1891, it is clear that tenants were paying part of the
revenue on land ‘owned’ by the janmis.104   The frame of reference adopted
excluded fluidity regarding family management and the possibility of
diverse arrangements regarding revenue payments, sharing of income,
or management and control of property itself within a single family.
With the odds high against formal recognition of women in
positions of authority it was difficult to supply ‘sufficient’ proof.  In an
appeal suit before him in 1878, Wigram disagreed with the Munsif’s
finding of a custom of female management.105   Acceding that the
defendant had indeed shown that her mother had, during her lifetime,
managed the affairs of the taravad, as even the plaintiff had admitted;
also that the defendant’s mother had managed excellently for no less
than thirty-five years, he infers, almost tendentiously, that, “it may well
be that the male members as they grew up should wish to leave the
management in her hands”, and further that the evidence of the defendant
was “perfectly consistent with her [the defendant’s mother] having
103 Ibid.
104 Malapurath Para Nambi, for instance pointed out that while his taravad
paid Rs 500, his tenants paid Rs 10,000.  RMMC II, Appendix IV.   An
appeal suit in 1927 involved a karar (written contract) made in 1876 by
which taravad property was described as  striswothu and it was agreed that
government assessment and renewal demises would be in the name of the
senior woman and that the senior male member would collect rents.  Puthelath
Chatti Soopi v Kannan Nair,  pp 874-77.
105 S.A. 434 of 1878 in Moore, Malabar Law, p 122.
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assumed the management because there were no males of age in the
taravad”.  He also cautioned that “[t]he management of a female, like
the management of an Anandravan must (in my opinion) always be
presumed to be with the consent of those on whom the law confers the
right of management i.e., the senior male, and may at any time be
resumed.”106  (emphasis added).  Stipulating that in some taravads females
were entrusted with the management with the consent of the males,
Wigram contends that he had not yet heard of a case where headship was
claimed as a right by a female.  The decree was confirmed by the High
Court.107
The presumption in favour of management by men in Malabar
carried with it suspicion of managerial claims by women.  In contrast in
South Canara, the presumption was in favour of women.108   Yet, a close
look at available evidence from two cases, less than ten years apart, from
Malabar and South Canara respectively, suggests that judicial approach
106 Ibid.
107 Wigram is ‘alert’ to the deceptive potentials of claims of management by
women.  In his compilation on Malabar law, he takes objection to a High
Court judge’s decision to secure the rights of a minor girl to the taravad
estate against efforts to enforce a lease of certain forests for ninety nine
years, entered into by the three surviving adult males of the taravad on
familiar grounds – that, “it assumes without sufficient proof that there was
a valid custom in the family vesting the management in the females”.
Besides, he warns that, “the experience of those best competent to judge
tells them that, in nine cases out of ten, where a family arrangement has
been made vesting the management in females, it has been done for the
purpose of fraudulently delaying or defeating creditors”.  Ibid, pp 123-
124.
108 “The legal right to the family property is vested in the female members of
the family jointly, but for little other practical purpose than regulating the
course of succession…  [P]ossession and control of the property belongs
exclusively to the ejaman, or manager, of the family, who is ordinarily the
senior of the female members... [and members] individually have no right
to anything beyond such support”. Ibid, p 124
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was more at ease with and hence privileged male authority.  In a suit
brought by the younger of two adult males in a taravad to remove the
elder, who was karanavan, the latter’s conduct was found to be such as
to warrant his removal.109   On appeal, Wigram, the acting District Judge,
chose to appoint a Receiver rather than rule in favour of the plaintiff’s
claim to the position of karanavan.
Meanwhile a second suit was brought by the senior female in the
taravad  to remove the elder male and appoint her in his place.  In fact
Wigram was aware of the second suit and makes the following
observation.  “I do not think it would be in the interests of the tarawad to
allow young married females to manage the property and their interests
will be amply protected by the course I propose to adopt.”110   With both
suits before them, the Judges of the High Court, Morgan and Holloway,
came down strongly on “the mischievous extension of the doctrine as to
the removal of karanavans… The state of families and property in
Malabar will always create difficulties.  Their solution will not be
assisted by bringing in the anarchy and insecurity which will always
follow upon any attempt to weaken the natural authority of the
Karanavan”111   (emphasis added).
109 Eravanni Revivarman v Ittapu Revivarman, p 153
110 Ibid, p 153.
111 Ibid, p 156. The need to protect the karanavan’s powers in the interests of
discipline was invoked elsewhere too.  In a case the de jure karanavan had
renounced his rights and the taravad had been managed as two tavazhis for
78 years.  On the right of a tavazhi karanavan to sue for recovery of
property, the High Court held that no delegation of powers by the karanavan
was irrevocable even by the delegator and still less by his successors.  The
judges cautioned that “with so peculiar a condition of property as that of
Malabar, it is most essential for the avoiding of complete anarchy and
consequent ruin to maintain the distinct rule as to the Karanavan’s powers.”
Velia Kaimal v Velluthedatha Shamy, SA no 372 of 1870, MHCR 6, (1870-
71), p 401.
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They categorized these as a new crop of litigation facilitated by
the sympathies of judges who were themselves junior members of
taravads.  “[I]t has been exercised on the mistaken principle that a man
can properly be removed whenever a single departure from his duty to
act equally for the benefit of all can be proved against the karanavan…
The plaintiff in the regular suit was really the Brahmin paramour of one
of the women and a by no means desirable manager for a Malabar family”.
They ruled that the question was not whether a man was unworthy of
his position as karanavan but whether the removal would benefit the
family, a position  suggesting the expediency of the move.112
Quite in contrast to the Malabar case, the High Court on appeal
overturned the South Canara District judge’s decision against
management by males. 113   Two women, Deyi and Ammu sought to
remove Devu Shetty, the senior male, from his position as yejamanan
(karanavan) and to recover property belonging to the family.  The
plaintiff claimed that the senior woman was the yejamanan under
aliyasantana law.  Two questions were taken up for decision in the High
Court: whether it was the senior male or female or only the senior female
that is entitled to be the yejamanan and assuming the latter whether she
is entitled to countermand a karar (written contract).  The High Court
judges concluded that the first question was still res integra but found
that they were unable to concur with the District Judge’s decision in
favour of the plaintiff and particularly with his observation that
management by males was detrimental to the interests of the family and
that their natural instincts were in conflict with the duty, which they
owe to the family.  They pointed out that “the question was not merely
112 Ibid.
113 Devu v Deyi, ILR 8, (1885), pp 358-61.
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one of expediency”,  (emphasis added)  and that in neighbouring Malabar
the general rule was in favour of management by males!114
Conclusion
Anthropological literature on matriliny, read against the grain,
could help contend with the historical contingency of and regional
differences in practices and power relations in the matrilineal taravad.
Quite at odds with this picture, the legal discourse on matriliny insisted
on a timeless and immutable frame for customs. Colonial administrators
tended to interpret matrilineal customs as binaries of more familiar
patrilineal customs.  Matriliny itself was understood virtually as the
absence of patriliny.  This also gave rise to an idealised conception of
matriliny. Constituting this the karanavan implied the absence of the
father.  By maintaining that the karanavan in a matrilineal joint family
was in exactly the same position as the father in a Hindu family, the civil
courts merely replaced the father (in the patrilineal mode) with the
karanavan (also in the patrilineal mode of the father) exhausting the
role, place and legitimacy of the father. That the karanavan as ‘head of
family’ was also vested with guardianship of ‘married’ women (and of
taravad property) made room for greater difficulty, for this constituted a
breach of the sexual contract embedded in ‘marriage’.  The notion of
‘marriage as a contract’ endorsed by the courts (embedded in the European
social contract theories) required the husband to assume these roles, in
the absence of which it was argued there could be no legally valid
notion of marriage!115   Legitimacy then was seen as tied to a specifically
114 Regarding the karar, where the District Judge found that it showed only a
temporary arrangement made for separate enjoyment, the High Court Judges
held that, “[t]he arrangement is in our opinion a family arrangement made
by all its members… and even assuming that the senior respondent is the
lawful yejaman, we do not think that the karar can be arbitrarily set aside by
her”.  Ibid, p 361.
115 Typically, for instance, the Malabar Marriage Commission uses the notion
of ‘marriage as a contract’ to conclude that “the principles of
Marumakkatayam law do not recognise the institution of marriage”.  RMMC
I, p 26.
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European notion of marriage and could not be internal to societal
contexts.
The patrilineal ‘commonsense’ of the colonial administration also
facilitated older male control over property.  The interpretations created
asymmetrical possibilities along the axes of gender, generation and
proximity to the nodes of power a) by specifically ordering functions
according to gender and generation and b) by constituting positions of
authority in a patriarchal and patrilineal mode.  Hence the legal discourse,
marked  by an absence of serious engagement with local expressions of
matriliny, lent pace and direction to the homogenization of practices
across regions and social groups.
Importantly, in patrilineal societies, authority and lineage/descent
of property were seen to flow together or at least very substantially
together among the same set of persons (among men).  In contrast, in
matrilineal societies, and when patriarchal as in the legal discourse in
Malabar, authority descended through the senior males and lineage/
descent through women.  In deriving rules by analogy with familiar
patrilineal rules, the legal discourse poses as potentially destructive,
the tension between lineage/descent of property in the female line and
significant roles of authority/responsibility for men.  Judges were
exhorted to “maintain the distinct powers as to the karanavan” so as to
avoid that anarchy that was only to be expected of a system so “peculiar”
and “difficult”; matrilineal descent was read as conferring merely a
theoretical right to property to women collectively, as having no practical
implications for power relations.
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